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Abstract
We analyze a two-sector, general-equilibrium model of productive match-
ing and sorting, where risky production is carried out by pairs of individ-
uals both exerting effort. Risk-neutral (entrepreneurial) individuals can
match either with other risk-neutral individuals, or – acting as employ-
ers/insurers – with risk-averse (nonentrepreneurial) individuals. Although
the latter option has the potential to generate more surplus, when effort is
unobservable and risk is high, the moral hazard problem in mixed matches
may be too severe for mixing to be attractive to both risk aversion types,
leading to a segregated equilibrium in which risk-averse individuals select
low-risk, low-yielding activities. An increase in the return associated with
the riskier sector can then trigger a switch from a mixed to a segregated
equilibrium, causing aggregate output to fall.
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1 Introduction
Does the extractive sector in a natural resource rich country drain risk-taking
entrepreneurs from the rest of the economy? An affirmative answer to this ques-
tion could provide an explanation for the so-called “natural resource curse”– the
consistent finding in cross-country regressions that a country’s share of natural
resources in GDP is a strong (negative) predictor of economic performance.1
In this paper, we propose a new, contract-theory based explanation for this
negative relationship between resource abundance and economic performance,
and, more generally, for the entrepreneurial “failure” that aﬄicts less developed
economies – beyond the specific case of natural-resource abundant countries. The
essence of our argument is as follows. Absent complete insurance markets, pro-
ductivity differentials across sectors depend on the intersectoral allocation of
entrepreneurial risk-taking across sectors. Such allocation, in turn, depends on
intersectoral risk differentials. Large risk differentials can lead to a concentration
of entrepreneurial risk-taking in the riskier sectors (such as mining) and a conse-
quent reduction in entrepreneurial risk-taking, and hence in productivity, in the
rest of the economy.
To formalize this argument, we develop a two-sector model of productive
matching and sorting, where risky production is carried out by teams of two
individuals both exerting effort. Risk-neutral, entrepreneurial type individuals
can either match with other risk-neutral individuals in symmetric contractual ar-
rangements or with risk-averse individuals in asymmetric arrangements whereby
they assume risk in exchange for an implicit insurance premium – thus acting
as employers/insurers. The latter option can potentially generate extra surplus;
but in a setting of high uncertainty and incomplete information about individual
effort, the severity of the associated moral hazard problem might prevent this
surplus from materializing. We show that if production risk is sufficiently high,
risk takers will opt to undertake the risky activity with other risk takers rather
than acting as employers/insurers; and, left without insurance, risk-averse indi-
1Gelb (1988), Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997a,b), Lane and Tornell (1996), and Gylfason,
Herbertsson and Zoega (1999), among others.
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viduals will select low-risk, low-yield activities. The economy will then reach a
type segregated, low-output equilibrium, where individuals match assortatively
with respect to risk attitudes, and where the resulting type-homogenous matches
sort themselves across sectors by risk-aversion type – risk-neutral matches in the
high-risk sector, risk-averse matches in the low-risk sector.
The characterization of entrepreneurs as risk-taking insurers can be traced
back to Knight (1921);2 but there has been less attention in the literature on
the role of risk-taking entrepreneurs in projects that need to be carried out by
teams.3 Once we characterize entrepreneurs in this way, entrepreneurial failure
can be thought of as an outcome where risk takers do not act as partners/insurers
in mixed-type production teams, preferring instead to team with other risk takers
in higher-yield, riskier projects, and thus leaving the other individuals with no
option but to self-insure by selecting low-risk, low-yield activities.
Segregation by risk-aversion type might provide an explanation for the persis-
tently low levels of labor productivity commonly observed in the manufacturing
sectors of less developed economies. Empirical evidence shows that this obser-
vation cannot be fully accounted for by low levels of workers’ human capital;
Fafchamps and Soderbom (2005) suggest that inefficient management, rather
than a lack of human capital, may be to blame4 – a conjecture similar in spirit
to our own argument.
Literature on the relationship between entrepreneurship and underdevelop-
ment has traditionally emphasized the role of wealth constraints in preventing
new entrepreneurial activity (e.g. Evans and Jovanovich, 1989). However, a
number of recent empirical contributions have cast doubt on this interpretation:
2Khilstrom and Laffont (1979) show that, in a model of general equilibrium, less risk-averse
individuals become entrepreneurs and more risk-averse individuals become laborers. For a more
recent statement and critique of this idea, see Newman (2007).
3The idea that insurance can be gainfully combined with another type of transaction in
an incomplete market setting is an old one in the literature (Stiglitz, 1974) but its general-
equilibrium implications have not been fully recognized.
4Moreover, Bigsten at al (2000) show that the increase in the schooling rates fail to result in
an increase in productivity in African countries and Eicher (1985) and Seernels (1999) notice
that African economy are often characterized by high levels of graduate unemployment.
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Bhide (2000) shows that the start-up capital for successful projects is usually very
low; and Hurst and Lusardi (2004) find that initial wealth is not significant in
explaining entrepreneurial choices for low levels of income.5 Our characterization
of entrepreneurial failure does not hinge on the presence of wealth constraints;
rather, in our model entrepreneurial failure can arise whenever insurance markets
are incomplete and there are significant intersectoral risk differentials.
Several features of our formal analysis relate to the more recent theoretical
literature on matching. Legros and Newman (2006) analyze a model of match-
ing in which surplus is not directly transferable, and derive sufficient conditions
for positive and negative assortative matching outcomes. One of the applica-
tions they explicitly consider is matching for risk sharing purposes;6 for this case,
they show that all equilibria involve nonassortative matching between individuals
with different degrees of risk aversion. That result is consistent with our own find-
ings: the presence of a hidden-action problem within heterogeneous teams limits
transferability and can thus give rise to assortative matching. Two other related
papers by Besley and Ghatak (2004, 2005) examine matching in the presence of
moral hazard, as we do here, but do not focus on matching with respect to risk
attitudes. Our analysis further adds to this literature by explicitly incorporating
sorting choices into a matching problem.7
5See also Moore (2004).
6See also Chiappori and Reny (2006).
7Our paper is also related to the broader literature on contract failures in a development
context. The systemic linkages that have been stressed in this literature either revolve around
individual specific linkages (e.g. Mookherjee, 1997, on the relationship between agrarian and
credit contracts with respect to land sales) – or around dynamic general-equilibrium linkages
that operate through asset accumulation (e.g. Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira,
1993; Proto 2007). The form of systemic linkage we analyze here – the general-equilibrium ef-
fects of contractual failures with respect to the allocation of productive factors across competing
production activities – has received comparatively less attention. A paper in this literature that
is more closely related to ours is Banerjee and Newman (1998), which analyzes a dual-economy
model where credit contracts in the traditional sector have an intrinsic informational advan-
tage over credit contracts in the modern sector. In our analysis, as in theirs, the allocation
of workers across sectors is determined by informational constraints; but in our model such
constraints operate differently in different sectors because of the different degree of production
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our
main model, and derives results for the one-sector and the two-sector cases in
turn; in Section 3, we look at the effects of introducing parallel insurance markets;
finally, we conclude the paper in Section 4 with a discussion of how our model’s
results can shed light on observed manufacturing productivity patterns.
2 A Two-sector Model of Productive Matching
and Sorting Under Risk
2.1 Preferences and Technology
There is an economy populated by finite numbers of individuals of two types, in-
dexed by i ∈ {N,A}. The two types differ with respect to their attitudes towards
consumption risk: type N is risk-neutral – the Bernoulli utility of consumption,
x, for this type is given by uN(x) = x – whereas type A is risk-averse – with con-
sumption utility uA(x) ∈ (u,∞) being continuous, strictly increasing, concave in
x, and satisfying limx→∞ u′(x) = 0. Individuals of both types are endowed with
an amount w of the consumption good. For simplicity, we derive our results in
terms of the transformation v(y) = uA(w + y) and without loss of generality, we
assume v(0) = 0.8
The economy produces a homogeneous good from inputs (labor) supplied by
the individuals. We assume that production must be carried out by teams of
exactly two individuals. This can be rationalized as follows: a lower bound on
the number of workers in a production unit can be associated with the presence
of fixed setup costs for each production unit; an upper bound is the limit case of
a scenario where there are decreasing returns in the size of a team. Focusing on
teams of exactly two is without loss of generality. Also, for expositional simplicity,
we shall assume that the numbers of individuals of each type, respectively nN and
risk associated with each sector, not because of intersectoral informational differentials.
8For any given preference ordering represented by an expected utility function with Bernoulli
utility vˆ(x), one can always define an equivalent expected utility representation with Bernoulli
utility v(x) ≡ vˆ(x)− vˆ(0) such that v(0) = 0.
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nA, are both even numbers. We furthermore assume nN < nA, i.e. risk-neutral
individuals are on the short side of the labor market.9
There are two production sectors, indexed by j = 1, 2. Two alternative pro-
duction technologies can be endogenously selected by teams in sector 1 – a risky,
high-surplus technology and a safe, low-surplus, zero-effort technology. In sector
2 only the high-surplus, high-risk technology is available.
The safe technology (available only in sector 1) simply yields an output S
with certainty and with no effort required.
Output from the risky, high-surplus technology (available in both sectors) is
a function of individual effort levels, respectively e′ and e′′ for each of the two
individuals in a team, and of individual-specific productivity shocks, respectively
θ′ and θ′′. For a given realization of shocks (θ′, θ′′), output is
f(θ′j, θ
′′
j ) = 2rj min{θ′j, θ′′j}, (1)
where rj is a sector-specific yield level. Individual effort is a discrete choice with
values {0, 1} and associated non-stochastic utility costs {0, C}. Effort levels, e′
and e′′, affect the distribution of individual-specific shocks:
θ′ =
{
1 with probability e
√
αj ,
0 otherwise,
(2)
where αj > 0 is a sector-specific parameter that captures the degree of riskiness
associated with production in a given sector. An analogous relationship exists
between e′′ and the distribution of θ′′. The probability of experiencing a positive
level of output for given levels of effort is therefore αj(e
′e′′). Expected output
in each sector under this technology and with full effort exerted by both team
members (e′ = e′′ = 1) is equal to αjrj ≡ ρj.
In our analysis we wish to focus on the effect of moral hazard on insurance
opportunities within teams, abstracting from problems related to free riding. The
specification we choose for the production function (1) allows us to do just that:
perfectly complementarity implies that there are no free-riding incentives – under
equal sharing, the efficient level of effort is also individually rational.
9This is not essential to our general argument, but it simplifies exposition.
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For both risk-aversion types, the risky technology is assumed to yield a higher
risk-free surplus under high effort than the alternative risk-free technology does,
i.e., for homogenous teams of N - and A-type individuals respectively, we assume
ρ1 − C > S;
v(ρ1)− C > v(S).
(3)
Sector 2 is assumed to be a comparatively higher-risk, higher-yield sector relative
to sector 1. Accordingly, we assume that α1 > α2 – i.e. the probability of a good
outcome in sector 2 is lower for any level of effort – and that
ρ1 < ρ2, (4)
(also implying ρ2 − C > S and v(ρ2) − C > v(S) by (4), as well as ρj > S,
j = 1, 2.) These assumptions together imply that the high-risk technology is
an efficient choice under perfect risk sharing, although, in risk-adjusted terms,
it might be dominated by the risk-free technology from the point of view of the
risk-averse type.
Finally, and without loss of generality, we normalize ρ1 = 1.
2.2 Contracts
For the time being, we shall maintain the assumption that the only available
contractual arrangements are between individuals within a production team, i.e.
individuals cannot enter into parallel insurance contracts; as we shall discuss in
Section 3, this is not crucial for many of our derivations, although it is central
to our main argument. There are otherwise no capacity constraints in each sec-
tors, and individuals are free to move between sectors and to select technologies.
Output is observable and verifiable.
Without loss of generality, a contract for a mixed team in sector j will be
represented in terms of non-negative state-contingent payments from the risk-
neutral team member to the risk-averse team members, respectively equal to Lj ≤
w + 2rj if the output realization is positive, and to Lj ≤ w otherwise. In order
to focus only on imperfections stemming from risk aversion, we wish to abstract
from the possibility of imperfect insurance deriving from wealth constraints; we
therefore assume that w is large enough for the above two constraints never to
be binding.
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As risk-neutral individuals constitute the short side of the market, equilibria
featuring mixed-type teams will involve contracts that maximize the surplus of
the risk-neutral type.
If effort is fully observable and verifiable, payments can be conditioned on it.
Full effort in a mixed match (eA = eN = 1, implying a probability of success
equal to αj) can then be supported by a contract that yields zero to the risk-
averse individual if her effort is low and positive amounts otherwise. An optimal,
individually-rational contract for the risk-neutral type must then solve
max
Lj ,Lj
2ρj − αjLj − (1− αj)Lj − C, (5)
subject to
αjv(Lj) + (1− αj)v(Lj)− C ≥ UA, (6)
2ρj − αjLj − (1− αj)Lj − C > ρ2 − C. (7)
Constraint (6) is the participation (individual rationality) constraint for the risk-
averse type, where UA represents the risk-averse type’s best outside option – the
maximum payoff a risk-averse individual can obtain in a non-mixed contract:
UA ≡ max{v(S), α1v(r1)− C, α2v(r2)− C}. (8)
Constraint (7) is the corresponding individual rationality constraint for the risk-
neutral individual.
If the shock realizations and individual effort levels are not observable, or
if they are observable but not verifiable, payments cannot be conditioned on
effort. The contract must then insure that a choice of high effort is optimal for
the risk-averse type individual, i.e., it must also satisfy the following incentive
compatibility constraint:
αjv(Lj) + (1− αj)v(Lj)− C ≥ v(Lj).10 (9)
We can disregard arrangements under which either eA or eN , or both, are
zero, since they are all dominated by the above contract or by outside options
for at least one individual type.
10The incentive compatibility constraint for the risk neutral is always trivially statisfied and
is therefore omitted.
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2.3 Matching Equilibria: One-sector Economy
Let us initially focus on an economy with only one sector, sector 1 (therefore
omitting the subscript 1), with αr = ρ = 1, and consider stable matching equi-
libria, in which no two individuals wish to abandon their respective matches to
rematch with one another in a new team.
In all types of matches, the risk-averse individuals will obtain a surplus UA.
Thus, the matching outcome will be dictated by the matching choices of the
risk-neutral individuals.
Consider first scenarios where, for the risk-averse type, the no-insurance, risk-
adjusted surplus is highest under the high-risk technology, i.e., scenarios with
αv(ρ/α) − C > v(S). Focusing on such scenarios implies the following lower
bound on α: α ≥ α˜(ρ), where α˜(ρ) solves
α˜v(ρ/α˜)− C = v(S); (10)
α˜(ρ) exists and is less than unity by (4) and by strict concavity of v.11 Concavity
of v also implies d (αv(ρ/α)) /dα > 0, and thus we can conclude that the expres-
sion α1v(ρ1/α1) − C is less than v(S) for any value α < α˜(ρ), and greater than
v(S) otherwise, i.e.
UA =
{
v(S) if α ∈ (0, α˜(ρ)),
αv(ρ/α)− C if α ∈ [α˜(ρ), 1].
(11)
Finally, given that the LHS of (10) is increasing in α and in ρ, we can conclude
that dα˜(ρ)/dρ > 0.
For scenarios where effort is fully observable, it can be readily shown that a
nonsegregated outcome will also be the only possible equilibrium even when the
risk-free technology offers the best outside option for the risk-averse type (i.e.,
for α < α˜) :
Proposition 1 With reference to a one-sector economy with full information, a
mixed-team contract satisfying individual rationality for both types always exists,
and the only possible matching equilibrium is a non-segregated equilibrium with
L = L < 1.
11This follows from v(1)− C > v(S) and ∂ (αv(ρ/α)) /∂α > 0.
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Proof: In scenarios where α ≥ α˜, a mixed-type contract will always (weakly) dominate
a segregated contract: no-insurance mixed-type contracts can never do worse for either
type than a segregated contract – the parties to a mixed match can always fall back
on the equal-split contract, obtaining no less than in segregated matches – and will
typically yield a higher surplus to risk-neutral individuals. So, for α ≥ α˜, the only
possible equilibrium will be a non-segregated equilibrium. Considering next scenarios
with α < α˜, concavity of v implies that surplus is maximized when payments are
state-independent, i.e. for L = L ≡ L. The minimum state-independent payment level
Lˇ that induces participation satisfies (6) with equality, i.e. v(Lˇ) − C = v(S). Since
v(1) − C > v(S) by (3), we can conclude that Lˇ < 1. The corresponding payoff for
the risk-neutral type is 2ρ − Lˇ − C = 2 − Lˇ − C > 1 − C, which is greater than the
segregation payoff, ρ− C = 1− C.
The intuition for this result is simply that full insurance, when possible, makes
payoff concavity irrelevant and thus restores transferability. This is consistent
with general results in the theoretical literature on matching, and with Chiappori
and Reny (2006) in particular, who demonstrate that even in an environment
where surplus can be transferred only indirectly because of payoff concavity, like
in the present one, mixing always occurs.
In contrast, if effort is unobservable or unverifiable, the risk-neutral type can-
not insure the risk-averse type efficiently (in a first-best sense), and hence may
be unable, in a mixed-type contract, to secure a surplus above that which it can
obtain by segregating. Then, two kinds of matching equilibria are possible: a
non-segregated equilibrium such as the one described above; and a segregated
equilibrium, where all risk-neutral individuals team with one another and adopt
the risky, high-surplus technology (which, by (3) gives them a higher surplus than
the risk-free technology) and where the risk-averse individuals team with one an-
other and adopt the risk-free technology. We will see that which type of equilib-
rium prevails in this case depends on the risk characteristics of the high-surplus
technology: if α is large enough (i.e. the bad outcome has low probability), there
will be scope for extra surplus being obtained in mixed teams through the provi-
sion of insurance within the contractual arrangement – the risk-neutral individual
insuring the risk-averse individual; but if the the risk of a bad outcome is too
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high, the the moral-hazard problem stemming from the non-verifiability of effort
will undermine the possibility of generating surplus through insurance in mixed-
type matches. The former scenario will result in a non-segregated equilibrium,
while the latter will lead to type segregation.
In order to state this result formally we first need to derive conditions for the
existence of an optimal incentive compatibility contract between a risk-averse
and risk-neutral individual. Given assumptions (3) and (4), contracts offered by
risk-neutral individuals must solve the following problem:
max
L,L
2ρ− αL− (1− α)L− C, (12)
subject to
αv(L) + (1− α)v(L)− C ≥ v(S), α ≤ α˜,
αv(L) + (1− α)v(L)− C ≥ αv(ρ/α)− C, α > α˜,
(13)
2ρ− αL− (1− α)L− C ≥ ρ− C, (14)
αv(L) + (1− α)v(L)− C ≥ v(L); (15)
where (14) and (13) are the participation constraints for the risk-neutral and
the risk-averse type, and (15) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the
risk-averse type.
Such a contract will only be feasible if production is not too risky:
Proposition 2 An incentive-compatible and individually rational mixed-type
contract – supporting a mixed-type matching equilibrium – exists if and only if
α ≥ α∗, with α∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: Let us begin with the case α ≤ α˜. The right-hand side of (13) then equals
v(S), and an optimum always involves (15) and (13) both binding – a contract that
leaves (15) slack could always be improved upon by another that features a lower L
and a higher L. This implies L = S at an optimum, and therefore
v(L) = v(S) +
C
α
. (16)
Continuity of v in R+ ensures the existence of a value of L satisfying (16) for any
α ∈ [0, α˜), and for any combination of S and C consistent with the restrictions defined
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by (3). Equation (16), in turn, implies L > S. We can rearrange constraint (14) as
ρ−S
α + S − L ≥ 0, and notice that this is equivalent to
v
(
ρ− S
α
+ S
)
− v(L) ≥ 0. (17)
Combining (16) and (17) and multiplying all terms by α, we obtain
αv
(
ρ− S
α
+ S
)
− C − αv(S) ≡ Ω(α) ≥ 0. (18)
Given assumptions (3), we have Ω(1) > 0. Moreover, using de l’Hoˆpital’s Rule, we
obtain limα→0 v
(
ρ−S
α + S
)
/(1/α)= v′
(
ρ−S
α + S
)
(ρ − S) = 0, and therefore we can
conclude that Ω(α) ≤ 0 for α → 0. We can also notice that dΩ(α)/dα > 0 , since we
can write it as
dΩ(α)
dα
=
v
(
ρ−S
α + S
)
− v(S)
ρ−S
α
− v′
(
ρ− S
α
+ S
)
,
and since first ratio in this expression – which represents a discrete incremental ratio – is
greater than the derivative v′
(
ρ−S
α + S
)
, by concavity of v. By continuity, monotonicity
then implies that there will exist a value α∗ such that
Ω(α∗) = 0, (19)
and such that Ω(α) ≥ 0 for α ≥ α∗.
Next, we show that α˜ > α∗. Let Γ(α) ≡ v(ρ/α)−C−v(S). The condition Γ(α) = 0
– equivalent to (10) – defines α˜, whereas Ω(α) = 0 defines α∗. The derivative of Γ(α)
with respect to α is
dΓ
dα
= v
( ρ
α
)
− ρ
α
v′
( ρ
α
)
. (20)
For α = 1, we have Γ(α) = Ω(α). Moreover, for α < 1, we have dΓ(α)/dα > dΩ(α)/dα,
since v(ρ/α) > v((ρ−S)/α+S)− v(S) and ρ
α2
v′( ρα) <
ρ−S
α2
v′
(
ρ−S
α + S
)
, by concavity
of v. We can then conclude that α˜ > α∗, and therefore there exists a non-empty interval
[α∗, α˜).
Finally, we can note that for α > α˜ an incentive-compatible, individually-rational
mixed contract always exists: a no-insurance contract featuring an equal split of the
output is always individually rational or both types, as it is equivalent to their respective
outside options; and, in a mixed match, the risk-neutral type can do strictly better by
offering the risk-averse type a contract with L < ρ and L > 0.
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Thus, private information about effort limits transferability in a more fun-
damental way than payoff concavity; and, as Legros and Newman (2005) show,
nontransferability can give rise to type segregation. When a risk-free technol-
ogy is the best outside option for the risk-averse type, an increase in risk in the
risky activity does not provide opportunities for greater surplus extraction by
the risk-neutral type; on the contrary, it only worsens the moral-hazard problem
and makes providing insurance more difficult for the risk-neutral type. Above a
certain level of risk (α < α∗), entrepreneurial type individuals will prefer not to in-
volve the risk-averse type and will opt to match instead with other entrepreneurial
type individuals in a pure-production, no-insurance relationship.
2.4 Matching Equilibria: Two-sector Economy
The introduction of a second sector in the economy enlarges the set of possible
configurations of production teams in a matching/sorting equilibrium. The fact
that sector 2 yields a higher return means that teams of risk-neutral individuals
will always select sector 2 in a segregated equilibrium, whereas in such an equi-
librium teams of risk-averse individuals will always select the risk-free technology
in sector 1. A non-segregated equilibrium, on the other hand, can have mixed
teams operating in sector 1 or in sector 2 depending on the configuration of the
parameters ρ1, ρ2, α1 and α2.
Considering problem (5), we note that a necessary condition for the existence
of a mixed contract in sector 1 is
ρ2 < 2− S, (21)
so that the maximum surplus that can be potentially extracted by the risk-neutral
type in a mixed contract in sector 1 is larger than the surplus obtainable in a
segregated contract in sector 2. Under assumptions (3), (4), and (21), we obtain
the following result:
Proposition 3 There exists a combination of thresholds, (α∗1(ρ2), α
∗
2(ρ2)), with
α∗2(ρ2) < α
∗
1(ρ2), such that, for αj < α
∗
j(ρ2), j = 1, 2, the only possible equilibrium
is a type segregated matching equilibrium where individuals sort themselves be-
tween sectors according to their risk-aversion type – risk-neutral teams selecting
sector 2, and risk-averse teams selecting the risk-free technology in sector 1.
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Proof: As we did earlier for the one-sector case, we can identify a value α˜1 ∈ (0, 1) such
that, for α1 < α˜1, the risk-free technology dominates the risky technology in sector one
for the risk-averse type in a segregated match; and, assuming α1 < α˜1, we can identify
a corresponding value α˜2 ∈ (0, 1) such that, for α2 < α˜2, the risk-free technology
also dominates the risky technology in sector 2 for the risk-averse type. Then, for
αj < α˜j , j = 1, 2, we can, for each sector, proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2, to
derive the following conditions for an incentive-compatible mixed contract in each of
the two sectors to be individually rational relative to segregation (i.e. when separately
comparing mixed contract in each sector with segregated contracts):
α1v
(
2− ρ2 − S
α1
+ S
)
− C − α1v(S) ≡ Ω1(α1, ρ2) ≥ 0; (22)
α2v
(
ρ2 − S
α2
+ S
)
− C − α2v(S) ≡ Ω2(α2, ρ2) ≥ 0. (23)
As in the proof of Proposition 2, we can conclude that there exist values α∗1(ρ2) and
α∗2(ρ2) such that Ω1 (α∗1(ρ2), ρ2) = 0 and Ω2 (α∗2(ρ2), ρ2) = 0, and such that, respec-
tively, Ω1 (α∗1(ρ2), ρ2) < 0 for α1 < α∗1(ρ2), and Ω2 (α∗2(ρ2), ρ2) < 0 for α2 < α∗2(ρ2),
i.e. such that a type-segregated match dominates mixed contracts in either sector for
the risk-neutral type. Moreover, for α1 = α2 = α, we have Ω1(α, ρ2) < Ω2(α, ρ2), since
ρ2 − S > 2 − ρ2 − S. Given that ∂Ω1/∂α1 > 0 and ∂Ω2/∂α2 > 0, we can therefore
conclude that α∗2(ρ2) < α∗1(ρ2).
Let us then consider a situation where α1 ≥ α∗1(ρ2) and α2 < α∗2(ρ), so that
mixed teams in sector 1 are chosen over segregated teams or mixed teams in
sector 2. What we want to focus on here is the possibility that, starting from
such a scenario, an increase in the profitability of sector 2 might trigger a switch
from a non-segregated to a segregated equilibrium:
Proposition 4 For any given level of ρ2 > 1, there exist combinations (αˆ1(ρ2),
αˆ2(ρ2)), for which an increase in ρ2 can trigger a switch from a non-segregated
to a segregated equilibrium in which the low-yield, risk-free technology is adopted
in sector 1.
Proof: As shown in the preceding proof, we have ∂Ωj(αj , ρ2)/∂αj > 0, j = 1, 2. One
can also verify that ∂Ω1(α1, ρ2)/∂ρ2 < 0, ∂Ω2(α2, ρ2)/∂ρ2 > 0, and that ∂Ω2(α2, ρ2)/∂ρ2
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is bounded. Let αˆ1(ρ2) = α∗1(ρ2) < α˜1, and select an arbitrarily small but positive value
αˆ2(ρ2) < α∗2(ρ2) (as we argued earlier, α∗2(ρ2) ∈ (0, α∗1(ρ2)), and is continuous in ρ2 for
all ρ2 ∈ [1, 2−S].) Then, in an economy characterized by α1 = αˆ1(ρ2) and α2 = αˆ2(ρ2)
(which support a non-segregated equilibrium), we can identify a right-hand neighbor-
hood of ρ2, N+(ρ2), such that, for ρ′2 ∈ N+(ρ2), we have α1 < α∗1(ρ′2) < α˜1 and
α2 < α
∗
2(ρ
′
2) (by boundedness of ∂Ω2(α2, ρ2)/∂ρ2), giving rise to a segregated equilib-
rium.
From the above, we also obtain a clearcut prediction about the effect of such
a switch on aggregate productivity:
Proposition 5 The switch described in the previous proposition will always re-
sult in a decrease in gross labor productivity.
Proof: This happens if and only if 2nN +(nA−nN )S > nNρ2+nAS, which is always
true given assumption (21).
The introduction of second, higher-yielding but riskier sector, can trigger
segregation. If it does so, it also brings about a fall in aggregate output – an
occurrence that can be described as a “high-yield sector curse”. This happens
because, by (21), the loss of output from switching from mixed matches to seg-
regated matches in sector 1 (which equals 1− S) is always larger than the extra
output obtained by segregated matches in sector 2 (which equals ρ2 − 1).
Only economies where production in sector 1 is not too risky (α1 ≥ α∗1(1)) can
be affected by the curse – for α1 < α
∗
1(1) segregation would occur independently
of the level of yield in sector 2. However, sector 1 must be risky enough that
the risk-neutral type would, if uninsured, opt to self-insure by adopting the risk-
free technology (α1 < α˜1). Moreover, the risk differential between sectors must
be sufficiently large (α2 < α
∗
2(ρ2) < α
∗
1(ρ2) ≤ α1). These are economies where
production risk is present everywhere but is not everywhere high, and where
therefore risk-neutral individuals could take on the role of entrepreneurs/insurers
in sector 1, were they not drawn to sector 2; and where sector 2 is too risky for
risk-neutral individuals to take on an entrepreneurial role there.
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3 Parallel Insurance Contracts
Can the presence of external insurers, not directly involved in production, offset
the consequences of adverse type segregation in productive matches? We will see
in this section that the answer is a qualified yes.
Suppose there exists a risk neutral agent – an “investor” – willing to insure
production units (as many as it is profitable for her to do) without taking part
in the production process. We will examine the effect of introducing such an
investor in an environment that would feature a segregated equilibrium other-
wise. Accordingly, assume α1 < α
∗
1(ρ2) and α2 < α
∗
2(ρ2). The investor can then
enter into insurance contracts with teams of risk-averse individuals who would be
unable to obtain insurance in mixed contracts with risk-neutral individuals and
would thus opt for the risk-free, low-yield technology in sector 1.
In order to keep the argument simple, we shall assume that the investor is
just as capable at observing output as individuals directly involved in production
(i.e. involvement in production does not confer an information advantage). A
profitable, incentive-compatible investment contract Lj, Lj, inducing risk-averse
individuals to select the higher-yielding technology in sector j over the risk-free
technology in sector 1, will exist if and only if
αjv(Lj) + (1− αj)v(Lj)− C ≥ v(S); (24)
αjv(Lj) + (1− αj)v(Lj)− C ≥ v(Lj); (25)
ρj − αjLj − (1− αj)Lj ≥ 0; (26)
where (24) and (25) respectively represent the participation and the incentive-
compatibility constraint for the risk-averse type, and (26) is the individual ratio-
nality constraint for the investor (the contract must yield non-negative profits).
We can then show that
Proposition 6 There exist combinations (αˇ1(ρ2), αˇ2(ρ2)), with αˇ1(ρ2) < α
∗
1(ρ2)
and αˇ2(ρ2) < α
∗
2(ρ2), such that the introduction of an external investor induces a
switch from the low-yield, risk-free technology to the higher-yield, risky technology
in sector 1.
Proof: Let (L′j , L
′
j) be the contract maximizing the investor’s profits in sector j.
We note that this contract is, for all j, the same as that which would be chosen by
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the risk-neutral type in a mixed match in the absence of an external investor (as
described in the previous sections), since Lj and Lj enter the objective of both the
investor and the risk-neutral type linearly and with the same weights. A profitable,
incentive-compatible investment contract in sector 2 exists if, at an optimum, it is
the case that ρ2 − α2L′2 − (1 − α2)L′2 ≥ 0 (condition (26)); but since α2 < α∗2(ρ2),
the incentive-compatibility constraint (15) for an optimal mixed contract in sector 2,
would be violated for j = 2, implying 2ρ2 − α1L′1 − (1− α1)L′1 −C < ρ2 −C, which is
incompatible with (26). Therefore, if the risk-neutral type does not find mixed matches
in sector 2 attractive, then the investor will also not find it profitable to insure risk-
averse teams in sector 2. The situation is different for sector 1, since in this case the
non-negative profit condition is 1 − α1L′1 − (1 − α1)L′1 ≥ 0. This is not incompatible
with α1 < α∗1(ρ2), which implies 2− α1L′1 − (1− α1)L′1 − C < ρ2 − C, by (15) (recall
that ρ2 > 1). The investor may thus still find it profitable to insure risk-averse teams in
sector 1 even when the risk-neutral type opts to segregate in sector 2. This will occur
if α2 < α∗2(ρ2) and α∗1(1) ≤ α1 < α∗1(ρ2) – noting that α∗1(1) coincides with the value
of α1 that solves 1− α1L′1 − (1− α1)L′1 = 0.
Parallel insurance contracts outside the production unit suffer from the same
informational problem as insurance arrangements in mixed matches. However, if
risk is not too high, and therefore the moral hazard problem is not too severe,
offering insurance can still be profitable for an outside investor even when a risk-
neutral individual would opt to segregate. The intuition behind this is simply
that, with a second higher-yielding sector, the net value of the outside option for
risk-neutral type can be higher than the corresponding net value for investors.
In such scenarios (α∗1(1) ≤ α1 < α∗1(ρ2)) the availability of outside insurance
can raise productivity in the low-risk sector, breaking the high-yield sector curse.
Note that these scenarios are precisely those in which the introduction of a second,
higher-yield, higher-risk sector would give rise to segregation: α1 ≥ α∗1(1) implies
that the corresponding single-sector economy would feature mixed matches.12 If
12One could argue, however, that direct involvement in production confers an informa-
tional advantage, and that therefore an outside investor would not be as effective as an en-
trepreneur/insurer at extracting surplus through insurance. If this case, one can show that
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risk is too high in both sectors (α1 < α
∗
1(1), i.e. when a single-sector version
of the economy would still yield segregation) neither mixed matches nor parallel
insurance contracts (a financial sector) can arise.
Thus, financial development can break the curse. But financial development
can only occur in economies where informational problems are not too severe
– i.e. in those economies that are capable of experiencing a high-yield sector
curse. Economies in which production risk is excessively high and widespread
are affected by a more fundamental low-productivity curse, which is independent
of factor abundance and cannot be broken by financial development.
4 Discussion
Our analysis shows that the introduction of a high-yield, risky sector may result
in a loss of gross productivity in the other sectors as well as in aggregate. The
segregation outcome we have described can be interpreted as an “entrepreneurial
drag”: high-yield, high-risk activities – such as mining or, even, illegal activities
– can divert risk takers from lower-risk activities in which they could take on
the role of entrepreneurs/insurers vis-a`-vis more risk-averse individuals. The key
mechanism at work here is that a given extent of informational asymmetry within
a contract has a greater or smaller adverse effect on surplus generation through
insurance depending on the degree of production risk. Hence, intersectoral risk
differentials can give rise to a segregated, “dual” structure even where there are
no intrinsic information differentials across sectors.
As we have argued in the introduction, this mechanism could provide an expla-
nation for the natural resource curse. The argument that has traditionally been
invoked to explain this empirical regularity is that the high income generated
by natural resources raises the demand for nontradeables and thus their prices,
which in turn makes manufacturing sectors uncompetitive.13 However, as noted
there would still remain scenarios where the introduction of a second sector lowers aggregate
productivity even when parallel insurance contracts are available.
13Corden and Neary (1982), van Wijnbergen (1984), Krugman (1987), Sachs and Warner
(1995), and Baland and Francois (2000).
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by Sachs and Warner (2001), this “dutch disease”-type interpretation cannot di-
rectly explain why often we also correspondingly observe lower labor productivity
(and wages) in the non natural resource sectors, unless we also invoke the idea
that the manufacturing sector drives technological progress.14,15 Our argument
can provide an alternative, more direct explanation for the natural resource curse,
one that does not hinge on the presence of technological spillovers.
Cross-country evidence on the relationship between sectoral productivity and
natural resource abundance (presented in the Appendix) exhibits the following
patterns: (i) the gap between non skilled wage in the manufacturing and in
the extractive sector is increasing in the size of the (comparatively riskier) non-
fuel extractive sector, and only so in the less developed economies; (ii) labor
productivity in the manufacturing sector is inversely related to the size of the non-
fuel extractive sector. Nonpecuniary compensating differentials could account for
(i), but not for (ii); and, taken jointly, (i) and (ii) are inconsistent with a dutch-
disease based explanation – without invoking further dynamic linkages. On the
other hand, these patterns are directly compatible with a crowding-out effect
consistent with our model’s predictions.
References
Azam, J.P., and J.-Y. Lesueur (1997). “Efficiency Wage and Supervision: Theory and
Application to the Ivorian Manufacturing Sector,” Journal of African Economics
6, 445-462.
Baland, J.-M., and P. Francois (2000). “Rent-seeking and Resource Booms,” Journal
of Development Economics 61, 527-542.
Banerjee A.V., and A.F. Newman (1993). “Occupational Choice and the Process of
Development,” Journal of Political Economy 101, 274-298.
14On the contrary, a dutch-disease scenario involves a wage increase in all sectors.
15The literature has also offered alternative explanations linked to the adverse effects that the
rent seeking behavior associated with natural resources can have on institutions (e.g. Collier
and Hoeﬄer (2000), and Lane and Tornell (1996, 1999)).
18
Banerjee A.V., and A.F. Newman (1998). “Information, the Dual Economy, and
Development,” Review of Economic Studies 64, 631-653.
Besley, T., and M. Ghatak (2005). “Competition and In-centives with Motivated
Agents,”American Economic Review 95, 616-636.
Besley, T., and M. Ghatak (2006). “Sorting with Motivated Agents: Implications for
School Competition and Teacher Incentives,” mimeo.
Bhide, A. (2000). The Origin and Evolution of New Businesses. Oxford University
Press.
Bigsten, A., P. Collier, S. Dercon, M. Fafchamps, B. Gauthier, J. Gunning, A. Isaksson,
A. Oduro, R. Oostendorp, C. Patillo, M. Soderbom, F. Teal, A. Zeufack and S.
Appleton (2000). “Rates of Return on Physical and Human Capital in Africa’s
Manufacturing Sector,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 48, 801-
827.
Collier, P., and A. Hoeﬄer (2000).”Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” World Bank
Policy Research Paper 2355.
Corden, W.M., and J.P. Neary (1982). “Booming Sector and De-industrialisation in a
Small Open Economy,” Economic Journal 92, 825-848.
Eicher, J. (1985). “Le Syndrome du Diploˆme et le Choˆmage des Jeunes Diploˆme´s en
Afrique Francophone au Sud du Sahara: Re´flexions de Synthe`se,”Addis Ababa:
JASPA, International Labour Organization.
Evans, D., and B. Jovanovic (1989). “An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice
Under Liquidity Constraints,” Journal of Political Economy 97, 808-827.
Fafchamps, M., and M. Soderbom (2004). “Wages and Labor Management in African
Manufacturing,” mimeo.
Galor, O., and J. Zeira (1993). “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics,” Review
of Economic Studies 65, 35-52.
Gelb, A. (1988). Windfall Gains: Blessing or Curse? Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford.
Gylfason, T., T.T. Herbertsson, and G. Zoega (1999). “A Mixed Blessing: Natural
Resources and Economic Growth,” Macroeconomic Dynamics 3, 204-225.
Kihlstrom, R., and J. Laffont (1979). “A general Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory
of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion,” Journal of Political Economy 87,
719-747.
19
Knight, F. (1921). Risk, uncertainty, and profit . Boston: Houghton-Miﬄin.
Krugman, P. (1987). “The Narrow Moving Band, the Dutch Disease, and the Competi-
tive Consequences of Mrs. Thatcher: Notes on Trade in the Presence of Dynamic
Scale Economies,” Journal of Development Economics 37, 41-55.
Lane, P.R., and A. Tornell (1996). “Power, Growth and the Voracity Effect,” Journal
of Economic Growth 1, 213-241.
Legros, P., and A.F. Newman (2005). “Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative
Matching with Nontransferabilities,” forthcoming in Econometrica.
Mehlum, H., K. Moene, and R. Torvik (2006). “Institutions and the Resource Curse,”
Economic Journal, 116, 1-20.
Mookherjee, D. (1997). “Wealth Effects, Incentives and Productivity,” Review of
Development Economics 1, 116-133.
Moore, K. (2004). “Do Liquidity Constraints Matter for New Entrepreneurs?” mimeo.
Newman, A.F. (2007). “Risk-Bearing and Entrepreneurship,” forthcoming in the Jour-
nal of Economic Theory.
Proto, E. (2007). “Land and the Transition from a Dual to a Modern Economy,”
Journal of Development Economics 83, 88-108.
Sachs, J.D., and A.M. Warner (1995). “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic
Growth,” NBER Working Paper No. 5398.
Sachs, J.D., and A.M. Warner (1997a). “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic
Growth - revised version,” mimeo, Harvard University.
Sachs, J.D., and A.M. Warner (1997b). “Sources of Slow growth in African Economies,”
Journal of African Economies 6, 335-376.
Sachs, J.D., and A.M. Warner (2001). “The curse of Natural Resources,” European
Economic Review 45, 827-838.
Serneels, P. (1999). “Unemployment Duration in Urban Ethiopia,” mimeo.
Tornell, A., and P.R. Lane (1999). “The Voracity Effect,” American Economic Review
89, 22-46.
van Wijnbergen, S. (1984). “The ‘Dutch Disease’: A Disease after All?” Economic
Journal 94, 41-55.
20
Appendix
A.1 Wage Differentials and the Size of the Mining Sector
We consider a panel of twenty-eight countries between 1969 and 2004, with several
missing observations, for a total of 605 observations. The dependent variable is the
ratio of wages in mining and quarrying sector (data are from ILO 2005 survey: ISIC
2, Major division 2 and ISIC 3 tabulation category C) to wages in the manufacturing
sectors (ISIC 2, Major division 3 and ISIC 3 tabulation category D).16 We focus on
“production labor” (i.e. manual labor, sometimes also labeled as “unskilled labor”), in
order to abstract from any intersectorial heterogeneity in the skill composition of labor.
The variables that refer to natural resources are the share of fuel, FEX, and non-fuel,
OME, mineral exports in total exports (World Bank, World Development Indicators
2005).
From Table 1, first regression, we can notice that only OME is statistically sig-
nificant, while FEX does not seem to have any significant impact on the gap. This
is consistent with our predictions, since non-fuel extraction is a comparatively riskier
activity relative to oil extraction, which is also less labor intensive. In regression 2
we include per capita GDP (WDI, 2005). We would expect that any misallocation
problems associated with inefficient segregation should be mitigated by the presence of
developed financial markets; and we would expect financial market development to be
positively related to per capita GDP. As expected, the new variable has a negative and
highly significant impact, and the coefficient for OME becomes substantially smaller,
although it remains significant at the ten percent level.
A.2 Manufacturing Productivity and the Size of the Mining Sector
We consider a panel of thirty countries between 1980 and 2003, for a total of 595 obser-
vations. The dependent variable is labor productivity in manufacturing, calculated in
terms of gross production over total employees (ILO labor statistics database, 2005).
As in the preceding regressions, the variables for natural resources are the shares of
fuel, FEX, and non fuel, OME, mineral exports in total exports. We include per
capita GDP in the regression to control for technology differentials.
The coefficient for OME is negative and highly significant, which seems to suggest
that the presence of non-fuel natural resources has an adverse impact on manufacturing
productivity. Interestingly, the coefficient for FEX is positive and significant, suggest-
ing again a difference between oil extraction and riskier, more labor-intensive natural
resource sectors.
16The definition of mining and quarrying includes fuel and non-fuel mineral extraction.
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Table 1: Intersectoral Wage Gap
1 2
Years 1969-2004 1969-2004
Non-fuel resource extraction .012 .008
(.00435)*** (.00456)*
Fuel resource extraction .001 .0008
(.00117) (.0011)
GDP -.0000147
(4.84e-06)***
Country fixed effects YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES
No. of observations 612 605
No. of countries 29 28
R2 .0740 .2564
F test 38.32*** 38.59***
Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
Table 2: Manufacturing Productivity
Years 1980-2003
Non-fuel resource extraction -1064
(357)***
Fuel resource extraction 92.755
(38.79)**
GDP 2.18
(.1568)***
Country fixed effects YES
Year fixed effects YES
No. of observations 595
No. of countries 30
R2 .534
F test 44.24***
Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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